Pittsburgh ‘Jock Tax’ Facilitates Parity and Should Be Upheld

The outcome of a Pennsylvania case involving a tax on nonresident athletes and entertainers could set up similar court challenges in other states or provide a path forward for cities to recoup some of the cost of hosting major events in public venues.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is poised to decide this year whether the “jock tax,” a 3% fee charged by the city of Pittsburgh on nonresident athletes and entertainers, violates the state constitution’s uniformity clause. The case has already drawn headlines, thanks to the nuanced questions of constitutional law and for featuring celebrities such as Taylor Swift.

The key issue is how to equitably balance the obligations of residents and nonresidents in contributing to a local tax base. The court will need to clarify whether the facility fee aligns with the state’s constitutional requirement that taxpayers under the same classification be taxed uniformly.

This case shows that uniformity in taxation doesn’t mean treating all taxpayers identically regardless of circumstances. That would be tantamount to charging season-ticket-holding attendees to a sporting event the same entrance fees as those not holding season passes. True uniformity must ensure taxpayers contribute fairly, roughly relative to the benefits they receive and burdens they share.

Pittsburgh’s 3% facility fee is levied on income earned by nonresident athletes and entertainers during performances or games at publicly funded venues in the city. The fee mirrors the 3% total city income tax burden borne by Pittsburgh residents, who pay a 1% earned income tax and 2% school district tax.

Pittsburgh officials argue this fee creates parity between resident and nonresident taxpayers. Residents contribute through multiple local taxes to fund city services, such as infrastructure and public safety.

Opponents counter that it unfairly targets nonresidents, as it explicitly singles out a narrow category of workers—nonresident entertainers and athletes—for taxation. They argue this violates the state constitution, which requires that taxes be applied uniformly within a given class of taxpayers.

So how do we define “uniform” for tax purposes? The challenge resembles the classic hypothetical of legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart’s “No Vehicles in the Park” thought experiment, which illustrates the complexities of legal interpretation and the limitations of language in translating a broad policy philosophy into applied law.

The experiment presents a straightforward rule limiting use of a local park, but it becomes clear that the rule’s application is anything but straightforward and depends on its intent.

If the vehicle ban’s goal is to enhance public safety while allowing people to enjoy the park, you might exclude mobility scooters from the definition of “vehicle.” Banning such conveyances would sacrifice some people’s enjoyment for a broad notion of safety in a way that undermines the rule’s purpose.

But if the intent is to protect a fragile historic walking path, including mobility scooters within the definition might be appropriate—even at the cost of restricting access. It may even be necessary for the safety of scooter operators.

Similarly, the dispute over the facility fee revolves around interpreting what uniformity within classes of taxpayers means under Pennsylvania law. The fee’s intent seems clear: to level the playing field between residents and nonresidents who benefit from publicly funded venues. But because of jurisdictional concerns, it has to achieve this through different mechanisms—a resident income tax and a nonresident facility fee.

Without the fee, nonresident athletes and entertainers enjoy a tax advantage over residents who live and work in Pittsburgh. Such an outcome would be at least as unfair as charging the fee itself, as an out-of-town performer would be better off compared with one who chose to take up residence.

While residents receive benefits that nonresidents don’t, including access to the school system and residents-only services such as trash collection, taxes have never been interpreted as strict payment for services rendered. This method of calculation helps determine who should bear the burden of a given tax, but it isn’t and can’t be considered definitive.

If taxes simply related to payment for services rendered, taxpayers without children could successfully appeal their obligations to fund public schools by proving no children lived at their homes. Residents could opt out of trash collection and demand their property taxes be reduced to account for their handling waste removal themselves.

No reasonable system of taxation would allow such outcomes. Taxes are meant to distribute the cost of maintaining shared resources and services equitably across those who benefit from them.

Nonresident performers benefit from the local public education system, through access to an educated pool of laborers and craftspeople, as much as residents without children do. Viewed from this perspective, Pittsburgh’s facility fee isn’t just justified—it’s essential to maintaining fairness in the local tax structure. It ensures that nonresidents who use the city’s publicly funded venues and benefit from its public services contribute to their upkeep.

Focusing on the policy’s purpose rather than on a dictionary definition of “uniform,” as with Hart’s metaphorical park rule, leads to concluding that the fee is a mechanism for fairness—not discrimination.

If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejects the facility fee on the grounds of non-uniformity, it would create a perverse incentive: Nonresidents are rewarded by effectively having their use of public venues and city resources subsidized by residents. True economic fairness requires acknowledging these circumstances and tailoring policies accordingly.

Andrew Leahey is a tax and technology attorney, principal at Hunter Creek Consulting, and practice professor at Drexel Kline School of Law. Follow him on Mastodon at @andrew@esq.social

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